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Summary findings
The  "stylized  fact"  that  distribution  must  get worse  with  below  $1 a day moved  in opposite  directions.
economic  growth  in poor  countries  before  it can get  The gains  to poor  people  from  a distribution-neutral
better  turns  out  not  to be a fact at  all. Growth's  effects  growth  process will  tend  to be  lower,  the  higher  the
on  inequality  can  go either  way and  are contingent  on  extent  of initial  inequality.  A smaller  share  of total
several  other  factors.  income  must  imply a smaller  absolute  gain  from  a given
Bruno,  Ravallion,  and  Squire  found  no  sign in the  new  increment  to total  income.  Compensatory  direct
cross-country  data  they  assembled  that  growth  has any  interventions  can  be important,  provided  they  are
systematic  impact  on  inequality.  Possibly  measurement  integrated  into  a framework  of fiscal  and  monetary
errors  confound  the true  relationship,  but  they  think  it  discipline.
more  likely  that  the relationship  between  growth  and  The  evidence  does  not  suggest that  growth  is always
distribution  is not  as simple  as some  theories  have held.  distribution-neutral,  and it would  be wrong  to conclude
Since distribution  does  not  worsen,  growth  reduces  that  changes  in distribution  are of little  consequence.  The
absolute  poverty.  Indeed,  absolute  poverty  measures  point  is not  that  distribution  is irrelevant  or that  it never
typically  respond  quite  elastically  to growth,  and  the  changes,  but  that  its changes  are  roughly  uncorrelated
benefits  are certainly  not  confined  to those  near  typical  with economic  growth.
poverty  lines.  Trhere is no  intrinsic  tradeoff  between  long-run
Of course,  one cannot  say that  growth  always  benefits  aggregate  efficiency  and overall  equity.  Policies  aimed  at
the poor  or  that  none  of the  poor  lose from  pro-growth  helping  the poor  accumulate  productive  assets-
policy  reform  Only  aggregate  effects  are studied.  But for  especially  policies  to improve  schooling,  health,  and
17 of the  20 countries  for  which  they  assemble  quite  nutrition  - when  adopted  in a relatively  nondistorted
good  data  (from  at least  two  surveys  since  the mid-  framework.  are  important  instruments  for achieving
1980s),  the  mean  and  the  proportion  of people  living  higher  growth.
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Do the poor lose-either absolutely  or relatively-from policies  that promote aggregate
economuc  growth? Does  the answer  differ  between  middle-income  newly  industrialized  economies
and low-income  developing  countries? These questions are not new and were very much at the
center of the development  debate some twenty years ago in the discussion  of how to achieve
'redistribution with growth' (Chenery et al.,  1974).  They have recently achieved renewed
prominence  as many  countries  adjust  from the growth  crises  of the last two decades,  and as others
switch from centrally-planned  systems to market-based ones.  The claim has been made that
growth-oriented reform policies of the kind usually advocated by the International  Financial
Institutions  have worsened  the lot of the poor.
The first section of this paper reviews recent evidence indicating  that while income
inequality  differs  significantly  across  countries,  there is no discernable  systematic  impact  over time
of growth on inequality. Though there are exceptions, as a general rule sustainable  economic
growth  benefits  all layers of society  roughly in proportion to their initial  levels of living. Based
on the evidence of the last three decades,  there seems to oe no credible  support for the Kuznets
Hypothesis. And  there have  been few cases of immiserizing  growth.
In  the second section we switch from long-run growth to issues of adjustment and
iransition. Here we argue that the key components  linking growth, as a necessary  condition  for
sustained  poverty reduction,  and adjustment  (stabilization  plus structural  reform) as a necessary
condition  for aggregate  growth  repovery,  come out strengthened  from the recent  growth crises and
associated  reform  efforts. Obviously  necessity  is not sufficiency  and we do not argue that growth
alwtays  benefits  the poor, or that none of the poor lose from any pro-growth  policy reform. But
we do contend  that  macroeconomic  adjustment  and structural reform are essential  for sustainable
growth recovery  which  in turn is necessary  for a sustained  reduction  in aggregate  poverty.
The first  two sections  of the paper support and strengthen  the case  for policies  conducive
to broad-based  economic  growth  as part of a comprehensive  poverty  reduction  strategy, as argued
in the World  Development  Report  on poverty  (World  Bank, 1990),  and  the associated  Policy Paper
(World  Bank,  1991)  on Assistance  Strategies  to Reduce Poverty. But a macro-policy  enviromnent
conducive  to growth is not enough. The second part of the poverty reduction  strategy outlined
in World Bank (1990)-namely promoting  universal access to basic education,  health and social2
infrastructure  (as well  as the adoption  of social safety nets, particularly  in the process of recovery
from a low-level  growth  crisis)-has in recent  years received added support  from new research on
the reverse linkage  from initial distribution of assets and income to subsequent  growth.  In the
third section we review  the evidence that high inequality countries, such as a number in Latin
America and Africa, have lower growth and  remain inegalitarian, whereas low inequality
countries,  such  as many  in East  Asia, remain  egalitarian  and achieve  rapid poverty  reduction from
the process of growth.
The theoretical  underpinnings  of this reverse linkage are only gradually  being understood.
Some  lines of argument  originate  from political  economy  considerations:  concentration  of wealth,
such as in land  or human  capital,  lead to policies  that protect  sectarian  interests  and impede growth
for the rest of society;  inequality  may also enhance political instability. Another  argument has to
do  with credit-market imperfections, whereby investment in human and physical capital is
confined  to the owners  of initial wealth.  The policy implication  is that reducing  inequality, such
as  through  securing wide access to basic education and health, not only benefits the poor
immediately  but will benefit  all through higher growth.
The final section  of the paper draws out implications  for domestic  policy  and the IFIs.
I.  How Does  Growth Affect Distribution?
Recognizing  that  we are concerned  about  how the benefits of growth in aggregate  incomes
are distributed, the question  arises as to whether there is any systematic  tendency  for inequality
to change in the  process  of rising  average  affluerce.'  This is a long standing  issue in development
economics.  A still widely held view is that economic growth in low-income  countries will
necessarily be inequitable, and this view has had considerable influence  on thinkiDng  about
development  policy  (amongst  both advocates and critics of redistributive  interventions). By this
view  "...the  rich are usually the first to reap the benefits of national income growth" (Watkins,
There are tumnrous  measures of inequality that might be considered compelling, and in principle they can diverge
greatly in their assessments of whether distribution has improved.  In practice, however, for many of the purposes of
measurement there appears to be considerable congruence amongst a number of these measures. We will rely heavily
here  on the most widely used summary statistic on distribution, namely the Gini index.  There is also the question:
inequality of what?  Here we focus mainly on current income or consumption  inequality; both may diverge from other
measures that might be compelling  such as inequality in life-time utility or inequality in 'capabilities'  (on the latIer see
Sen, 1992).3
1995, p.34). Here we review  the theories and evidence, and provide  new results on more recent
and improved  data.
1.1  The Klunetg  HypntheSis
An influential  argument  as to why we might expect inequitable  growth in poor countries
was sketched  by Kuznets  (1955). This claims that inequality  will increase  in the early stages of
growth in  a developing  country and then-after  some point-it  will begin to  fall i.e.,  the
relationship  between  inequality  (on the vertical axis) and average  income  (horizontal)  will trace
out an inverted  U. Kunets did not set out a formal  theory  of why  this  might  happen, but sketched
an argument which has subsequently  been formalized.  As typically  presented, the "Kuznets
Hypothesis"  assumes  that  the economy  comprises  a low-inequality  and low-mean  rural sector, and
a richer urban sector  with higher inequality. Growth occurs  by rural labor shifting  to the urban
sector, such that  a representative  slice of the rural distribution  is transformed  into a representative
slice of the urban  distnbution.  Thus (by assumption)  distribution  is unchanged  within each sector.
Starting  with all the  population  in the mral sector, when the first worker  moves  to the urban sector
inequality must increase. And when the last rural worker leaves, it must clearly fall again.
Between these  extremes,  the relationship  between inequality  and average  income will follow an
inverted U.2
Kuznets himself was tentative about the hypothesis. Yet it has found many supporters
since,  to the point of being de6med "fully confirmed" by Oshima  (1970), a "stylized  fact" by
Ahluwalia (1976), and an "economic law" by Robinson (1976).  Claims of support for the
hypothesis  can be found  in a literature  spanning  25 years. 3 We shall  argue that the evidence from
cross-country  data  sets  has been  misleading  because  of omitted  country-level  effects. New studies
using panel data and within-country  time-series data do not support  the hypothesis.
2  See A nd  and  Kanbur  (1993)  for a more precise formulation,  and necessary  and sufficient  conditions  for the
inverted U for six possible inequality  measures.
3  AD  i_flneia  early  example was Adelman and Morris (1971).  At the time of writing the most recent example
we know of is Ram (1995).4
1.2  Crnsm-Country  Studies
There have been enumerable  tests of the Kuznets Hypothesis  on cross-country  data sets,
by regressing  a measure  of inequality  against a suitable  function  of average  income, and seeing
if that function follows  an inverted  U.  We shall not review the earlier literature  here and only
note that these tests have typically been ad hoc, with no clear link to the assumptions  of the
hypothesis.  Instead, we focus on a nagging concern about all the tests using cross-country
data-namely, that there  may  be important  country-level  determinants  of inequality  (including  past
inequality) which are correlated with current income levels, and so lead to biased estimates.
Indeed, such  biases  could  arise  solely from differences in the type  of data.  For example, income
is a more common measure  for inequality  in many middle-income  developing  countries, notably
in Latin America,  whereas  consumption  is more common elsewhere,  including  among the Asian
economies-many  of which  were  closer to the bottom of the income  ladder  20-30 years ago when
the data  used to test the  hypothesis  were set up.  And since consumption  inequality  is bound to be
lower  than income  inequality  due to consumption smoothing,  these  differences  alone would tend
to yield an inverted  U relationship  even if none existed  using the same welfare  measure. With
strong  latent  country-level  effects  there can be no guarantee  that differences  at one point in time
will reveal how inequality  will evolve with growth.
If such  country-level  effe6ts  were not in fact a problem,  then one would  expect to see the
inverted U reappearing  in later country cross-sections. So what do data since the mid-1980s
suggest about the Kuznets  Hypothesis? Using data from 63 surveys  spanning  1981-92  covering
44  countries,4 we tried replicating  a number  of  the  specifications for testing the  hypothesis
typically found in the literature. 5 This was done for both levels and changes over time, to
eliminate  the country-level  fixed effect.  In no case was there evidence  of an inverted  U, and in
no case  could one reject  the null hypothesis  that the regression  coefficients  were jointly zero.  This
4  This is the same data set used in Chen, Datt and Ravallion (1994), which gives details.
5  We tried regressing the Gini index against a quadratic function of mean consumption  (both linear and logs) as
well as the Anand and Kanbur (1993) specification in which the Gini is regressed on the mean and the reciprocal of the
mean. We also tried the  specificaion  proposed  by Ram (1995) in which a quadratic function of the mean is used but with
the intercept  suppressed;  while this  test did suggest an inverted U, it appears to have very low power to reject the Kuznets
Hypothesis;  indeed, on suppressing the intercept one  will find an inverted U between any two independent random
variables with positive means (Ravallion, 1995b).5
also confirms  earlier results  for smaller samples reported by World Bank  (1990), Fields (1989),
and Ravallion  (1995a). 6
It  appears then that the cross-country inverted U found in many earlier tests of the
hypothesis-mainly using compilations  of distributional data for the 1950s  to early 1970s-may
well  have  become  blurred,  if not  vanished,  over time. This probably  reflects  how  various omitted
variables  have  evolved. The  new data confurm  earlier concerns that these  omitted  variables were
creating  an appearance  of a cross-country  inverted U which had little  to do with the hypothesis.
We would conjecture  that with the growth seen in much of Asia, and the lack of it in much of
Africa,  the poor and low inequality  countries  of 20-30 years ago have slit into two, blurring the
old inverted  U but (quite possibly)  better revealing the true relationship.
1.3  Further Intertemporal Fvidence
To avoid confusing the effects of independent country-specific  characteristics  (initial
conditions)  with  those  of intertemporal  changes  of policies or economic  conditions,  arguments  for
or against the existence  of a Kuznets  process should ideally be based  on time-series  evidence.
Here we report on two  exercises  using time-series data.  The first draws on panel data covering
45 developed  and developing  countries  for the years 1947 to 1993. It contains  486 observations
on Gini indices. 7 And  the second  makes use of the most extensive  time-series  data for any single
developing country, namely  India. 8
Table 1 gives decade  av6rages  of the Gini indices for each of the 45 countries  for which
reasonably comparable estimates are available for four or more surveys.  While there is clearly
variation  over time (some of which could be differences  between surveys and/or measurement
errors), the data suggest substantially  greater variation in inequality across countries at given time
than over time for a given country.  Indeed 92 percent  of the variance in Gini indices by country
and date is accounted for by cross-country variation whereas only 7 percent is accounted for by
variation over time.
6  The latter  paper allows  for fixed  country-level  effects. Fields and Jakubson  (1992)  find  that the inverted  U
"flips"  to an ordinary  U when  one allows  for fixed  effects, but our data  do not  confirm  this  finding.
7  See Deininger,  Squire  and  Zhang  (1995)  for further details.
8  See Ravallion  and Datt  (1995).6
Table 1: Gini Indices  1960s-90s  (Decadl Averages?
Country  Observations  1960s  b  1970s  1980s  1990s  Trend'
Czechoslovakia  10  22.6  20.9  21.1
Bulgaria  25  22.1  21.9  23.0  27.3  0
Hungary  7  24.4  22.2  22.8  . 0
Poland  7  . . 25.2  . 0
Spain  6  . . 25.7  . 0
United Kingdom  31  25.0  24.3  27.3  32.4  +
Soviet Union  4  . . 26.0  . +
The Netherlands  9  . 28.1  28.6  . +
Taiwan  26  31.2  29.3  29.0  30.5  0
Finland  6  . 30.7  31.0  . 0
Canada ..  23  31.6  31.6  31.5  27.6  0
India  29  31.5  30.9  31.4  31.1  -
China  12  . . 31.5  36.2  +
New Zealand  11  31.4  34.1  *  +
Sweden  14  . 33.1  33.7  32.3  0
Indonesia  7  . 36.6  33.4  33.1  0
Pakistan  6  . 35.5  33.4  . 0
Norway  7  36.8  35.3  31.0
Korea  10  31.5  36.1  35.6  . 0
Japan  22  35.6  34.1  34.4  35.0  -
Italy  15  . 37.4  33.4  32.2  -
Bangladesh  9  33.5  34.8  37.3  . 0
USA  45  34.6  34.5  36.9  37.9  +
Australia  10  32.0  36.7  36.2  32.5  0
Belgium  8  36.4  42.0  29.6  35.8  0
Portugal  4  . 40.6  36.8  36.2  0
Germany, F  6  . 36.0  35.8  45.4  +
Cote  D'lvoire  5  . . 39.1  41.4  0
Singapore  6  . 39.0  40.7  . 0
Venezuela  4  . 41.5
Sri Lanka  7  46.0  38.8  43.7  . 0
Tunisia  5  42.3  44.0  43.0  41.0  0
Philippines  6  42.9  45.3  40.0  . 0
Hong Kong  10  47.5  41.9  41.4  45.0  0
France  7  48.0  41.6  37.8
Thailand  8  42.0  41.7  37.8  50.2  +
Baharas  11  . 48.2  44.4  43.0  -
Trinidad  and Tobago  4  . 48.5  41.7  . 0
Costa Rica  5  52.6  46.1  45.1  . 0
Malaysia  5  . 51.5  48.0  . 0
Colombia  5  . 52.1  51.2  . 0
Mexico  4  55.3  49.7
Honduras  S  . . 54.0  52.7  0
Chile  13  . . 54.8  53.1  0
Brazil  7  . 59.0  55.6  . 0
a.  The  table includes  all countries  with  four or more  observations,  based on household  survey  data  with  national  coverage. All
Gini  indices  are measured  for the same  indicator  (either  consumption  or income)  over time  for a given  country,  though it varies
between  countries. This accounts  for some of the cross-county  differences,  though  on adding  dummy  variables  for the type of
data in a pooled model  one still  finds  that the bulk of the variation is between countries  rather thn  over  time.
b.  Rank  correlations  of inequaliy  between  decades: 1960s-70s:  0.909; 1970s-80s:  0.863; 1980s-90s:  0.849; 1960s-80s: 0.850.
c.  The signs indicate  the significance  of the Gini time  trends ("0"  indicates  no significant  trend).7
The inequality  rankings  of countries  are thus highly stable over the decades;  between  the
1960s and 1980s  the rank correlation coefficient is 0.85 (Table 1).  The last column of Table 1
also gives the direction of the trend; 9 a "0" in the final column indicates  that the coefficient  on
time is not significantly  different  from zero at the 5 percent level, while a " + " ("-")  indicates  that
it is significantly positive (negative).  Only 17 countries out of 45 have a significant  trend in
inequality one way or another, and in 12 of the cases its value is small  (+  or - 0.4 a year).
It is plain  from Table  1 that there are strong  country  effects in inequality  which could well
entail appreciable  biases  in standard  tests of the Kuznets Hypothesis.  '0 For example,  if (as Table
1 suggests)  past inequality  is an important  predictor of current inequality,  and (as the arguments
and evidence  reviewed  in part III will suggest) past inequality  influences  current  incomes,  then
the standard  cross-country  regressions  used to test the inverted  U will be biased.
All this lends  support  to the view  that failure  to allow for country  effects  could be serious.
The search for a general law linking growth and inequality  must confront  the fact that the vast
bulk of the variation  one  finds  is amongst  countries,  not over time. Further statistical  tests on the
data set confirm  this  point. If one allows  for country-specific  effects, none of the countries  in the
samnple  appear  to follow the predictions made by Kuznets  hypothesis  (as mentioned  in Deininger
and Squire, 1995).
It  is worth reviewing  the data for India in more detail because it is one of the most
extensive and reliable series, and because it bears on subsequent  discussion. At the time of
writing we could  construct  distributions  of real household  consumption  expenditures  per person
in India from 33 nationally  representative  and reasonably,  comparable  household  surveys  spanning
the period 1951  to 1992." Figure 1 plots India's Gini index and net domestic  product  per person
from 1951  to 1991. There was a trend decrease  in inequality  up to about the mid-1960s,  but no
9  These are based on ordinary least squares estimates of the coefficient on time.
10  Ihese effects  may entail  either an omitted dynamic effect of past inequality or some other omitted country-level
fixed effect in the error term; either will bias standard tests on cross-sections of country data.
i  The surveys  were done by India's  National Sample Survey Organization. To form the national distributions of
real consumption  from the NSO tabulations  of nominal expenditure distributions, an allowance  was made for urban-rural
cost-of-living  differences, and for differences in the rate of inflation between urban and rural areas; for details see Datt
(1995).Figure 1: Inequality  and average  income in India
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trend in either direction  after that.  There is no sign that growth increased  inequality, including
during the period of higher growth in the 1980s.  On running  the Anand-Kanbur  test equation
appropriate  to the Gini index  one obtains, not an inverted U, but an ordinary  U, though for most
of the range  of the data  inequality  falls as average income increases. However, if one takes fit
differences  of the above  equation  (so that it is the change  in the Gini index between  surveys which
is regressed  on the change  in average income and the change  in its inverse)  then the relationship
vanishes. There  is no sign  in these  data  that higher growth rates in India put any upward pressure
on overall inequality.
1.4  Other L  eRsns  from Te.ctc of the KXmnets H=ytheqis
The fact  that  there  are such  strong country-level effects  in distribution  does not mean that
distribution  is unchangeable.  Some of the observed variation  (across  countries  and over ime) is
clearly due to differences  in the underlying data and measurement  errors.  But the literature on
testing the Kuznets  Hypothesis  has also suggested a number of other factors which appear to
influence inequality, and explain at least some of the omitted country-level  effects identified
above. Kuznets  (1966)  speculates  on a number of those factors, including  shifting  inter-sectoral
inequalities, a declining  share of (unequally  distributed) property income,  and policy changes
conceming  social  security  and  employment. But, on all these, the data base for testing  was weak
at the time Kuznets  was writing. That has changed.
Higher (primary  and secondary)  school enrolment  rates tend to be associated  with lower
inequality,  and the significance  of the income  variables tends to diminish  when education  is taken
into account. The quantitative  importance  of this effect suggests  that it may be policy-relevant:
A one-percent  increase  in the percentage of the labor force that has at least secondary  education
increases  the share  of income  received by the bottom 40 percent or 60 percent  by between 6 and
15 percent  (Bourguignon  and Morrisson, 1990). Papanek and Kyn (1986)  find that primary and
secondary school  enrollment  has a quantitatively  important  effect on the income-share  received
by the poorest 40 percent.  By contrast, it is significant but of low quantitative  importance  in
reducing inequality  (as measured  by the Gini index).  Human capital in primary and secondary
education had a significant  effect on reducing the Gini coefficient  in Korea, and increasing  the9
share  of the bottom  20 percent,  whereas university education  slightly  increased  the Gini and did
not significantly  affect  the bottom share of the income distribution  (Jung, 1992).
Mineral  and agricultural  exports  would  be expected  to increase  inequality  to the degree that
they produce concentrated  rents.  This is confirmed for developing  countries  where a sizable
(greater  than  5 percent)  contribution  of mineral  exports to GDP was associated  with a 4-6 percent
decreases of the bottom 40 percent income share (Bourguignon  and Morrisson, 1990).  High
importance  (greater  than  5 percent  of GDP) of agricultural  exports leads  to greater inequality only
if such exports are produced  on large, rather than on small and medium  farms.  By contrast,
Papanek and Kyn (1986), using data for developing as well as developed  countries, fail to find
significant effects, presumably  since failure to correct for protection  does not allow inferences
concerning the international  competitiveness  of such exports.
Trade theory  would  predict  that protection  lowers the reward  for the most abundant  (most
equally  distributed)  factor of production  and increases returns to scarce  factors, which are likely
to be the more inequitably  distributed. Presence of protection  indeed  seems  to worsen income
distribution (Bourguignon  and Morrisson, 1990).
There is evidence  for India  that the sectoral  composition  of growth  has played  a role in the
evolution of distribution. Recall that at the aggregate level, the data revealed little affect of
growth  on inequality.  Which  of the Kuznets'  assumptions  do not hold  for India? At any one date,
both mean consumption  and  inequality  are higher in urban areas as he postulated. But the radical
departure from the assumptions  of Kuznets is in the nature of India's growth  process.  Growth
under the Kuzmets  Hypothesis  is driven by rural to urban migration,  assuming  that the means and
distributions  remain  the same  within each sector.  However, Ravallion  and Datt (1995) find that
this process has been only a minor source of growth in India, the bulk of which  has come from
intra-sectoral  growth;  between 1970 and 1990, the Kuznets  growth  process  accounted  for only 6
percent of total consumption  growth, while growth within the urban  and mrual  sectors accounted
for 20 percent and 74 percent  respectively.
1.5  The Tmpact  nf G.rnwth  on Ahsohite Poverty
The still quite widely-held  pessimism about the scope for reducing  poverty through
economic growth  has rested  in large part on the belief that growth  would  be inequitable  in poor10
countries.  We have surveyed past and new  evidence on this view, and rejected it  as a
generalization;  yes, there  have  been cases in which growth was associated  with rising inequality,
but there have  been  at least  as many cases of falling inequality. There does not appear to be any
systematic  tendency  for distnbution  to improve  or worsen  with growth.  On average  then absolute
poverty will fall.  This is confirmed  by the results of a number of recent studies  (Fields, 1989;
World Bank,  1990, 1995; Squire, 1993; Ravallion,  1995a; Lipton and Ravallion, 1995).
How responsive  is poverty to economic growth?  Regressing  the rates of change in the
proportion of the population  living on less than $1 per day against  the rate of change in the real
4.
value of the survey mean for the 20 countries spanning 1984-93 we obtained a regression
coefficient of -2.12 (with  a t-ratio of -4.67); thus a 10 percent increase  in the mean can be
expected  to result  in roughly  a 20 percent drop in the proportion  of people  living on less than $1
per day.'2 This reflects  in large part the density of people living around  $1 per day.  But if we
also consider "higher-order"  measures of poverty the effect is even stronger; for the squared
poverty  gap index  proposed  by Foster  et al., (1984) the corresponding  elasticity  is even higher at
-3.46 (t=-2.98). '3  This indicates  that the gains are not confined  to those  near the poverty line.
These results confirm those  of Ravallion (1995a) on a smaller data set.
Somewhat  smaller  elasticities,  but broadly similar results, are obtained  if we look at the
evolution of poverty  over 40 years in India.  Over 33 household  surveys,  the elasticity of the
proportion of the population  below India's official poverty line and mean consumption  is -1.33
(t=15.19).  For the squared  poverty gap, the elasticity is -2.26 (t=10.22).'4
But growth is only one of the factors that has influenced  progress  in reducing  poverty,
albeit an important  one. The above  regressions  for rates of poverty  reduction  still leave a sizable
12  It might  be argued  tdat  this  cormlation  is pardy  spurious,  since  both the survey  mean  and  the poverty  index  were
estimated  from  the same  data. If instead  we use an Instrunental Variables  Estimator,  using  the growth  rate in GDP per
capita  between  the survey  dates  as the  instrument  then  we get a very  similar  result, namely  an elasticity  of -2.15 (t-ratio=-
3.24).  Since the national  accounts  and census are largely independent  of the household  surveys  our estirate  of the
elasticity  appears  to be robust.
3  The corresponding  Instrmental Variables  Estimate  is 4.11 (t=-2.36).
14  Using  the  rate  of  growth  in consumption  per person  from  the national  accounts  as an instrument,  the Instrumental
variables  Estimates  are -1.47  (t=6.51) for the head-count  index and -2.51 (t=4.50) for the squared  poverty  gap.11
share of the variance in country performance unaccounted for by growth.  Some of this is
measurement error.  But, measured changes in  inequality do  have a  strong independent
explanatory  power; indeed, rates of poverty reduction respond even more  elastically  to rates of
change in the Gini index than they do to the mean.  Regressing  the change in the log of the
proportion  of the population  living on less than $1 per day on the change  in the log of the survey
mean and the change in the log of the Gini index across 20 countries with two reasonably
comparable  observations  in the period 1984-92  one obtains  an elasticity  to the mean of -2.28 (t=-
6.07) while the elasticity  to the Gini is 3.86 (t=3.20).'5 So even seemingly  modest  changes in
overall inequality  can entail sizable changes in the incidence  of poverty. When  combined with
the tests of "augmented"  Kuznets  Hypotheses  discussed  above, we can postulate  a number  of other
factors that matter through  their influence  on inequality, including  education,  the trade regime,
and the sectoral  composition  of growth.  Later we will see whether some  or all of these factors
might also matter to the poor via their impact  on growth.
II.  Do Pro-growth Reforms Have Adverse Distributional Effects?
So far we have  argued  that the rate of overall economic  growth  has no systematic  impact
on inequality.  Yet, it has been argued that some of the policy changes  advocated  to promote
growth increase  inequality. For example, real devaluations  can promote growth, but they also
impact  on inequality,  though  the direction  of that effect  is not obvious  on a priori grounds.  Here
we look more closely  at the  role played by economy-wide  policy changes. In particular, we ask:
Do the economy-wide  factors (including  macroeconomic  policy changes)  which are likely to
increase  the overall rate of economic  growth also have,  distributional  implications?
2.1  Adju-tmernt and Trangition
For much of the  developing  world,  the 1980s  was a period  of rapidly  rising  servicing  costs
on foreign debt, external  terms-of-trade  shocks, and fiscal and external imbalances  entailing  an
unsustainable  excess of aggregate  demand over supply.  Adjustment  programs  were introduced
to help restore macroeconomic  balance, by combining fiscal contraction-cutting government
is  Ihe elasticity  to  changes  in  the Gini  index  is even  higher if one uses a measure  of poverty  which  better  reflects
distribution  amongst  the poor; using  the 'squared poverty  gap' index, the elasticity  to the Gini  rises  to 8.07 (t=2.49),
while  the elasticity  to the mean  is -3.79 (t=-3.61).12
spending  and/or raising  taxes-with supply-side  measures  aimed at reducing  inefficiency,  such  as
by cutting  trade  distortions  or wasteful  parastatals. Unless there is an exceptionally  rapid supply-
side  response,  somebody's  consumption  must fall.  The distribution  of the burden of adjustment
has been one of the most debated  issues in development  studies over the last decade. The issue
has been of even  greater  significance  in the centrally  planned economies  that are now privatizing
and placing much greater reliance on market solutions.  What can we say about the impact  of
adjustment  and transition  on the poor?
Many countries  were  not well equipped  with relevant household  level data for monitoring
..
welfare  impacts  of policy reform at the time that adjustment  began in the early 1980s. This has
improved since.  Yet even with good data, it can be difficult to isolate the role played by
adjustment. Poverty may have risen during an adjustment  period; but it may have risen even
fiurther  without  adjustment.  Much of the criticism  of adjustment  policies  may have  to do with the
observation  of real  hardships  that are temporarily  incurred at the stabilization  stage, yet would  in
all probability  be much greater were the crisis allowed to deepen  further.
One of the few clear patterns to emerge from the new household-level  evidence on the
evolution  of poverty  indicators  during adjustment  is that the poverty  measures  tend to move with
the mean consumption  or income of households, increasing  in recession  and falling in recovery
(Lipton and Ravallion, 1995, section  5.3).
What  happens  to the rate  -f  growth  in the adjustment  to a deep  crisis is therefore  of crucial
importance.  In this respect, an important  link to likely outcomes  for the poor can be found in
recent  findings  of relatively  speedy  growth  recovery  (in GDP though not in investment)  after deep
inflation (and growth) crisis (Bruno and Easterly, 1995). The median  per capita  growth rate in
a group of 13 successful  stabilizers  from more than 40 percent inflation  shifted  from -4 percent
in the years up to and including  the first year after stabilization  to a positive 1.5 percent in the
second  year and  close  to 4 percent  in the third and beyond. Even when aggregate  growth remains
temporarily  negative as inflation  already falls, it is not at all clear which way the distributional13
outcome  goes, as income  groups  whose nominal income is not tied to inflation, or whose income
taxes are withheld  at the source, will gain in relative terms as inflation  falls drasticaly.  16
The income  distributional  impacts  of adjustment depend  heavily  on the economy's initial
conditions, including  its openness, and the extent of flexibility  in its output and factor markets,
thus pointing to the importance  of market reforms as an important  conditioning  environment.
Actual  experiences  in distributional  shifts during adjustment  have been diverse. For example, in
the Philippines  adverse  distributional  effects resulted in higher poverty  despite  (modest) growth
in the late 1980s  (Balisacan,  1993). A small irnprovement  in distribution  helped  the poor during
adjustment in Indonesia  during the mid-1980s (Ravallion  and Huppi, 1991). Dorosh and Sahn
(1993) argue that the distributional  effects of real devaluations  will tend to be pro-poor in a
number of African  countries, since the rural poor tend to be net producers  of tradable goods.1 7
The diversity of initial conditions  warns against generalizations  on the distributional  impacts  of
adjustment.
A common presumption  is that countries under shock face a dynamic  trade-oft; living
standards  may fall in the short  term during adjustment (relative  to non-adjustment),  but they will
rise in the longer term.  However, this trade-off could well be overstated. For example, Peru
initially avoided adjustment,  and poverty rose sharply  in 1985-90 (Glewwe and Hall,  1994).  Yet
the subsequent period of more orthodox  reforms quickly saw positive growth and falling poverty
measures in 1991-94 (Favaro and MacIsaac,  1995).
2.2  Fyidence from Three Regions
In this subsection,  we review the evidence now available for Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America, the two regions most closely associated with adjustment, and then turn to the evidence
for the transitional economies of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.
16  This,  for example, was the case for wage earners as against profit earners in the Israeli stabilization of 1985.
Measurement is complicated  by the fact that inflation during the household survey period will generally put an upward
bias on inequality measures defined on nominal incomes (Kakwani, 1987); conversely, stabilization  will
impart a downward bias.
1  Lipton and Ravallion (1995) review other recent arguments and evidence on the impacts of adjustment on the
poor.14
New encouraging  results have been recorded for some  countries  in Africa. Demery and
Squire  (1995)  use household  survey  data at two points of time in the mid-eighties  to early nineties
to assess the change in poverty in the six African countries for which  such data are available.
They find that the five countries  experiencing improvement  in an index  measuring  performance
in fiscal, exchange  rate, and  monetary  policies  also saw poverty  decline,  whereas  the one country
in the sample  that witnessed  a deteriorating  policy performance  also suffered  increased  poverty
(Table 2).
Table  2: Alacroeconomic  Policy  and Poverty  in Africa
Country  Change  in Percent  Poor  Change  in Macro  Policy
(percentage  points  per annwn)  (weighted  score  of
macro-policy  variables)
Cote d'lvoire  +5.30  -1.65
Kenya  -0.28  +0.45
Nigeria  -1.44  +1.79
Tanzania  -1.83  +2.76
Ghana  -1.95  +1.35
Ethiopia  -3.60  +0.55
Source:  Demery  and Squire  (1995).
These results cannot  be extrapolated to the rest of the continent;  policy implementation
varied widely and on balance  poverty has almost certainly  increased.' 8 Nor can it be concluded
that all the poor benefitted  in the countries that saw declining  poverty  on average; the surveys
reveal that somne  among  the poor suffered greater deprivation. And it cannot  be claimed that
causality  from macroeconomnic  policy to poverty has been established. Nevertheless,  the data do
confirm that improvements  in macroeconomic  policy are consistent  with declines  in poverty even
in the short run.  This is in turn consistent with evidence  on growth;  poverty  fell where growth
was positive  and increased  where  growth  was negative. Indeed,  Demery  and Squire  show that the
change  in poverty was primarily determined by the change in mean income with changes in
18  See Chen  et al., (1994),  who  also show that countries without  adequate  poverty  data tend  also to have worse
macro  performnance,  so compilations  of available  poverty  data may well  under-state  the problem.15
inequality  playing  a secondary  role and, at least in  1s  sample, working in the opposite  direction
to growth as far as the poor are concerned.
In the Latin American  context Morley (1994) has likewise  recorded  a close relationship
between growth and outcomes  for the poor in the adjustment  process.  Reviewing  periods of
recession  (falling  per capita  income  for at least two years) and periods of recovery,  he finds that
poverty  increased  in 55 of the 58 cases of recession, and in 22 out of 32 recoveries  poverty fell.
Contrary to the results  from  the sample  of six African  countries,  Morley  fmds that recessions  were
accompanied  by rising  inequality  (the  poor suffered  doubly)  while recoveries  were associated  with
falling inequality (the poor benefited  doubly).  But, as in the African sample, the changes in
poverty could be attributed  mainly to changes in mean income.
Evidence  is also now  appearing  for the transitional  economies  of Eastern  Europe  and the
Former Soviet  Union  which  again  points  to the importance  of changes  in aggregate  GDP but also
to a systematic  trend towards  greater inequality. As might be expected  the large drops in GDP
in these countries have been reflected in substantially  higher levels of poverty. What is more
interesting  is the tendency  towards  greater  inequality. These countries  began the period with some
of the lowest Gini coefficients  in the world.  The transition has entailed  consistent  association
between growth and inequality:  they have both deteriorated (Milanovic,  1995).
Thus we find  evidence  of a systematic  worsening  of inequality  in the transitional  economies
as GDP has declined, but obsefve  no simple relationship  between growth  and inequality  in the
adjusting countries, although  the shifts in the Gini coefficient at least in Africa appear to have
been larger during  the adjustment  phase  than  during periods of stable growth. We conclude front
this discussion  that successful  adjustment  usually leads to growth recovery  which  will in general
also reduce poverty.  We end this section with two qualifications.
First,  it is important to  stress that the  detailed policy response, particularly in the
.ompoSitinnl  of public expenditure cuts,  can greatly  affect the poverty outcomes of adjustment.
In  some cases, aggregate budget contraction has been combined with rising shares (and
occasionally rising absolute  levels) of public spending in the social sectors,  including  targeted
transfers  (Ribe  et al. 1990;  World  Bank, 1990, Ch.7; Selowsky, 1991). In Indonesia,  the careful
mix of  public spending  cuts during adjustment, and the rapid currency devaluations,  helped16
mitigate the short-term consequences  for the poor of declining growth (Thorbecke, 1991).
Maintaining  public  infrastructure  can also  be crucial  to the success  of reform  programs. The fiscal
"crunch" often tempts governments  to cut these infrastructural  sectors. There is another lesson
here for the nature  of fiscal retrenchment  during stabilization.
And second, we have said nothing  about other dimensions  of poverty, including  human
development,  which  may not be adequately  reflected in income or consumption-based  measures
(Sen, 1992). It is beyond  our scope  to go deeply  into the non-income  dimensions  of welfare. But
there  is  evidence to  support two claims: I)  that progress in  reducing income poverty is
instrumentally  crucial to progress against most non-income  dimensions  of poverty; and ii) that
incomes are not all that matter, and indeed, for some non-income  dimensions  command  over
market goods may well be secondary to command over key publicly-provided  social services,
notably access to basic health care and schooling. 19 Cuts in key categories  of social spending
during adjustment  can entail heavy burdens on poor people, both in the short-run  and long-run.
m.  How Does Distribution Affect Growth?
So far we have looked at how growth might alter distribution. We now consider the
possibility  of a reverse  causation. There  are a number of ways in which  this could  happen.20  We
focus  on two: credit constraints  and political  economy. Both have potential  implications  for the
accumulation  of capital,  especially  human  capital, and growth.  The first affects  the access of the
poor to education  while the second affects incentives  and the returns  to education.
3.1  Credit  Distrihbution  and (Growth
By preventing  the poor from making productive investments  (such as schooling)  credit
constraints  arising  from asymmetric  information  perpetuate a low and inequitable  growth  process.
Furthermore,  the more inequitable  the initial distribution (and, hence, the greater  the number  of
poor and typically  credit constrained  people) the more severe this effect will be.  A number of
authors have examined  credit market imperfections  in general equilibrium  models  with lumpy
"  On these  issues  see Anand  and Ravallion  (1993)  and Bidani  and Ravallion  (1995).
2  Quite  generally,  when  markets  are incomplete  there  wil be efficiency  implications  of changes  in distribution  (Hoff,
1993). Some  specific  examples  in  the literature  are reviewed  in Lipton  and Ravallion  (1995,  section  5.1). The following
discussion  draws  in part on Deininger  and Squire  (1995).17
investment  (Banerjee  and Newman  1991, Tsiddon 1992, Saint-Paul  and Verdier 1992, Galor and
Zeira 1993).  The main result is that, where credit market constraints  prevent the poor from
making productive indivisible investments, inequalities in  the wealth distribution can have
significant negative impacts  on growth. What can policy do? Here we review three possible
actions: provision  of credit, redistribution  of assets, and tax-subsidy  interventions.
Intervention  in credit markets aimed at channeling  credit directly  to rationed  groups via
subsidized interest rates may well reduce growth even further.  In a dynamic  perspective such
interventions  are likely  to cause efficiency-decreasing  distortions  and rent-seeking  behavior, thus
further reducing  efficiency  and equity (Bencivenga  and Smith, 1991).
An alternative approach  entails equalizing the distribution  of assets both to increase  the
poor's ownership  of capital  directly  and to increase  their  access  to credit  markets. A large number
of analytical  models  have stressed the importance  of the initial distribution  of endowments,  and
the potentially  large  increases  in social welfare that could be gained  by an initial redistribution  of
assets (including  Banerjee and Newman 1993, and Chatterjee 1991).  Evidence from Asian
countries (Japan,  Taiwan, and Korea)-where externally  imposed  land reform was followed by
high growth-appears to support  the hypothesis. But in many situations  such redistribution  may
be possible  only with  full compensation. Whether, and under what circumstances,  such schemes
will then pass the scrutiny  of careful evaluation has yet to be determined. 2" There are often less
ambitious  but still  potentially  important opportunities  for giving poor farmers  greater security of
tenure in places  where land rights are ill defined.
If  the informational  imperfections that cause. credit rationing cannot be eliminated,
governments can seek ways around them by subsidizing education  and taxing future wages.
Assuming  that  higher  education  is reflected in higher lifetime  earnings, governments  can provide
subsidies  to schooling  and finance them through a tax on future earnings, without  having to deal
with the problems  involved  in identifying individual ability (Hoff and Lyon, 1994). It can be
shown that policies  mandating  compulsory schooling, financed by a proportional  tax on wage
21  Ongoing  Bank  involvement  in  market-assisted  land reform operations  in South  Africa  and Colombia  would  provide
an opportunity  to test this  empirically.18
income, increase economic  growth and, by distributing from agents with high human capital
* endowment to those with less, make the intragenerational  distribution  of income more equal
(Eckstein  and Zilcha,  1994). Where  it is very difficult to identify  the "type"  of individual  agents
ex ante, or if access  to credit  markets is highly unequal, such policies  can be desirable.
3.2  Political Fcnnnmy
The  preceding discussion suggests that  amongst economies characterized by  credit
rationing,  those  with  a more  equal  distribution  of wealth will accumulate  more human  capital and
grow faster  than  those  marked  by a more inegalitarian  distribution.  High  inequality  will also make
it easier to adopt  distortionary  policies  that  will negatively  affect  individuals'  investment  decisions,
stifle growth, and conceivably  generate political instability.
The most common  mechanism used to  establish a  link between political forces and
economic outcomes  is the notion of the median voter.  According  to this argument,  the median
voter's  distance from the average  capital endowment  in the economy  will increase  with wealth
inequality,  thus leading  him or her to support  a capital  tax rate that is higher the more unequal the
distribution  of wealth. This  in turn would  reduce  incentives  for investment  in physical  and human
capital resulting in lower  growth.
However, the median-voter  model may not be a plausible  description  of the political
process  governing  decision-making  in most developing  countries. An alternative  mechanism  relies
on lobbying.  Greater wealth  aflows the rich to spend more resources  on lobbying  activities  to
obtain differential treatment.  In the extreme form, the ability to lobby would be directly
proportional  to the amount  of economic  assets  owned by.an individual. A model  that utilizes  this
assumption is provided  by Persson and Tabellini (1992) who draw a connection  between high
concentration  of land, landowners'  ability to successfully  lobby government  for preferential tax-
treatment  of this asset, and the ensuing  over-investment  in land. Such disproportionate  taxation
of non-landowning  groups  leads to increasing inequality  over time and to slower  growth.
Inequality  of asset  ownership  is also at the root of the many  models  that  relate inflation to
inequality  of the distribution  of income. The key idea is that inflation  imposes  losses on certain
groups and that such losses are distributed very inequitably.  While inflation  taxes holders of
money  assets  (i.e., the rich),  access to foreign currency  and capital  flight allows  them to shift the19
burden of inflation  to the poor  (Verdier  and Saint-Paul, 1993). This opens  not only the possibility
for the rich to 'park" their  assets  abroad  and then approve inflationary  policies  (as these would  be
financed by the poor), it could also form the basis for strategic  behavior  of the rich (in support
of 'populist' policies)  that could give rise to the typical "stop-and  go" policy  cycles  observed in
many Latin-American  countries  (Laban  and Sturzenegger, 1992). Similarly,  Ozler and Tabellini
(1991) model the "class  struggle"  between workers, capital, and the government  and-based on
the capitalists' ability to invest  in a risk-free foreign asset at the world  interest  rate-show there
is a broad range of situations  where domestic investment and growth would be negatively
associated  with inequality  in the distribution  of assets.
In contrast  to median-voter  models, lobbying models can incorporate  dynamic  effects and
strategic  behavior. If politicians  are self-interested,  the ability of the rich to offer high bribes, and
the inability of the poor to resist taxation, can lead to path-dependent  equilibria  (Brainard  and
Verdier,  1994);  for example,  industries  affected  by a negative shock may  choose  whether  to adjust
or to lobby for protection  depending on the type of politician in power.  Adjustment  will be
slower, the more responsive  politicians  are to lobbying, in which case growth-reducing  policy
interventions  would  be expected  to increase  with overall wealth-inequality.
IRecent  models  have  emphasized  that major policy  decisions,  in particular  the adoption  of
macro-economic  stabilization  measures,  can be understood  in the framework  of a bargaining  game
between different social groups.  While many factors beyond the distribution  of income can
influence bargaining  power,  income distribution plays an important  role. Models  that describe
economic  stabilization as  a  strategic game  between the  rich  and the  poor  show that
stabilization-being associated  with an increase in aggregate  productivity-is more likely to be
delayed, the greater the inequality  of the income distribution (Alesina  and Drazen 1991). The
reason is that an unequal  distribution  of income (or differential  access  to "fmancial  technology"
that could be used to diversify  risk) implies that waiting  reduces the utility of the rich only
marginally  while  imposing  large costs on the poor.  This would, in turn, increase  the probability
that in the end the poor will give in and shoulder all of the cost of adjustment. The model can
also  be used to show  that even  if (often under external pressure or acute  fiscal crisis) adjustment
measures are adopted, the lack of social consensus or the perception  by some  groups that they20
have to pay a disproportionate  share of adjustment  costs may lead to backsliding  as soon as the
external pressures  subside  (Laban  and Sturzenegger,  1994).
3.3  nhe  vidence
The arguments  reviewed  above suggest that greater income inequality  will lead to lower
investment  in physical  and  human  capital  and hence to slower  growth. There have  been a number
of  recent attempts to test this hypothesis.  Data quality is unusually worrying  here.  While
household  survey  methods  have  improved  greatly in the last 10-15  years, a large  question  mark
must be attached to the quality and comparability  of the historical  data on distribution  in the
1950s, 1960s  and 1970s  which  have  been  used to test the impact  of initial distribution  on growth.2
And (unlike  the tests  of the Kuznets  Hypothesis),  the noisy inequality  variable  is now  on the right
hand side, so there  must be a general  presumption  that standard  estimators  will give  biased results.
While these and other issues  of data and econometric specification  should  not be under-rated,23
they take us beyond  our present  scope.
The tests that have  been reported in recent literature  confirm a negative  impact  of initial
inequality on growth, both in developed  as well as developing  countries  (Alesina  and Rodrik,
1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Clarke, 1994).  For a sample of nine OECD countries,
analysis  of 20-year  growth  rates  starting  from 1830 show  that the income share  of the top quintile
is negatively  related  to growth;  it explains  about 20 percent of the variance  of growth  rates across
countries  and an increase  of one  standard  deviation  in this share decreases  the growth  rate by half
a percentage point (Persson  and Tabellini, 1994).  For a sample of developing  and developed
countries,  Clarke  (1993)  shows  a robust, though quantitatively  small, relationship  between  initial
inequality  and growth  that  holds  for different  econometric  specifications  and independently  of the
regime type.  In addition, the empirical prediction that high inequality  in landownership  is
associated with lower capital  accumulation  and growth is confirmed  for samples  of 35 and 50
22  Some of the 'data points"  in these older  compilations  were not even  based  on household  surveys,  but were
synthotic  estimates-let  alone  that  the quality  of the survey  data sets  used was highly  variable;  for an overview  of these
issues see Fields  (1994). Recent  compilations  have gone some way toward  eliminating  these  problems  (Chen  et al.,
1994).
23  The inchlsion  of the  initial  average  income  variable  on the right  hand side  of these  equations  explaining  the rate
of growth  also raises  concerns  about  bias in the estimators  widely  used in this literature.21
countries (Persson and Tabellini, 1994).  There is also evidence from a cross-section  of 70
countries  for the period  1960-85  that economic  inequality  increases  political  instability  and reduces
physical capital  investment  (Alesina and Perotti, 1993).
But the verdict  is not yet in on how strong or robust is the impact  of initial inequality  on
future growth.  For example, in one test, Fishlow (1995)  reports no significant  effect once one
controls  for Latin  America  (with simultaneously  high inequality  and low  growth  for much of the
period).2"  As in tests of the Kuznets hypothesis discussed in section 1.2, there may well be
regional  effects in the cross-sectional  relationship, though that fact alone does not mean the
relationship is spurious-like the Kuznets Hypothesis, the real test will be in how the regional
effects evolve  over time. Further empirical work is clearly  needed, and the better distributional
data now available  should  stimulate  future research into the role of initial inequality.
IV.  Conclusions
The "stylized fact" that distribution must get worse in poor countries  before it can get
better  turns out not to be a fact at all.  Effects of growth on inequality  can go either way and are
contingent on a number of other factors.  There is little sign in the new cross-country  data we
assembled of any systematic  impact of growth on inequality.  Possibly  measurement  errors are
confounding the true relationship.  But we think it more likely that the relationship  between
growth and  distribution  is by no means as simple  as some  theories in development  economics  have
postulated.
If distribution  is unchanged  then growth will reduce absolute  poverty. Indeed, absolute
poverty  measures  typically  respond quite elastically  to growth, and the benefits  are certainly  not
confined to those  near the poverty line.
One should be clear about what can and cannot  be concluded  from our results.  Let us
reiterate that it would  not be correct to say that growth  always benefits  the poor, or that none of
the poor lose from pro-growth  policy reforms.  Here we are only looking  at broad aggregates.
Cases of sufficiently  adverse  distributional  impacts to wipe out the aggregate  gains to the poor do
appear to be unusual; indeed, for 17 of the 20 countries  for which we can assemble  quite good
24  hbough  Clarke  reports  that  the inequality  effect on growth  is robust  to this and  other  changes  in specification.22
data from at least  two surveys  since the mid-1980s, the mean and the proportion  of people living
below $1 per day moved in opposite direction.  But there can be large differences between
countries  in the extent  to which  even  a distribution-neutral  growth process  will impact  on absolute
poverty. The gains to poor people from such a growth process will tend to be lower  the higher
the extent  of initial  inequality;  under distribution-neutrality,  a smaller  share  of total income must
imply  a smaller  absolute  gain  from a given  increment  to total income. And  even in countries  with
initially  low inequality  and a growth process which brings rapid and sizable  gains  to most of the
poor, some will not be in a position to take advantage  of the new opportunities,  and some may
well lose. There can be an important  role here for compensatory  direct  interventions,  providing
they are well integrated  into the general policy framework, in keeping with overall fiscal and
monetary discipline.
Nor does the evidence  suggest that growth is always  distribution-neutral.  And it would
also  be wrong  to conchlude  that changes  in distribution are of little consequence.  Indeed, we find
that poverty  measures  respond  quite elastically  to changes  in distribution;  our cross-country  data
suggest that a 10 percent increase in the Gini index is typically  associated  with roughly a 40
percent increase in the proportion  of the population living on less than $1 per day (holding the
mean income  constant). The point is not that distribution  is irrelevant,  or that it never changes,
but rather that its changes  are roughly orthogonal to economic  growth.
While  there  is little  convificing  evidence  in our view that growth  tends  to alter distribution
in a systematic  way,  there are more compelling  (theoretical  and empirical)  arguments  as to why
initial distribution  matters  to the extent and nature of subsequent  growth. This link can operate
through  credit  market  constraints,  by limiting  the ability  of the poor to invest. The negative effect
on  growth is strengthened  if distortionary policy-interventions  in favor of the rich further
undermine the poor's incentives  to invest.
Thus  there  is no intrinsic  trade-off between long-run  efficiency  and equity. In particular,
policies aimed at facilitating  accumulation  of productive  assets by the poor-when adopted in a
relatively  non-distorted  framework-are also important instruments  for achieving  higher growth.
The problem should  not be posed as that of choosing between  growth  and redistribution.23
When one puts  these  two  halves  together-one on the impact  of growth  on distribution, and
one on the reverse  causation-we can begin to see the structure and some of the details of a joint
model of distribution  and growth, and hence of poverty.  The extent to which this is a truly
simultaneous  model  is a moot  point; distribution  appears  to affect  growth  more than growth affects
distribution, though this interrelationship  is still being researched.  There is also a dynamic
structure  to this  joint model,  in which  initial  conditions (of average  incomes,  inequality,  and other
factors) do matter. Within  this structure, a common set of policy-relevant  explanatory  variables
can be identified,  of which  basic  education  is one of the more robust  predictors  of both variables;
higher proportions  of men and women with good basic schooling  entails  a better  distribution of
a larger total income.
Countries  which  give  priority  to basic  human capabilities  in schooling,  health  and nutrition
not  only  directly enhance well-being, but  are  also more  likely to  see improving income
distributions and higher average  incomes over the longer term.  There are often also ways in
which governments  can help relieve the credit constraints facing the poor, though even means-
tested credit subsidies  will typically  not be the best way; reducing  transaction  costs and helping
people  organize themselves  have often proved to  be better approaches. A more equitable
distribution  of physical  assets,  notably land, can also help greatly (both  directly  and by relieving
credit  constraints on investment  by poor people), though the policy implications  are not as
straightforward  as with health  and education. The sectoral  composition  of economic  growth  has
also been emphasized  as an important  factor. Sectoral biases against  the rural sector in pricing,
exchange rates, and public investment  are not in the interests of either higher  growth or better
distribution. And  sound  macroeconomic  policies appear to be essential  for sustained  growth, and
either  have  no systematic  effect  on distribution,  or have potentially  adverse  short-term  impacts  but
which are typically  not strong  enough to outweigh the gains to the poor from growth.  Paying
attention  to the cornposition  of public  expenditures  in the adjustment  program  and to the inclusion
of effective  safety  nets for the poor will help improve the distributional  outcome  in the transition
to a pro-poor growth recovery.
Some of the key factors  in achieving  an equitable growth  path, such  as better schooling,
also raise the current living standards of poor people, in both "income"  and "non-income"24
dimensions. The nature of the dynamic interaction  of initial conditions  with future growth and
distributional change can also have important policy implications. Countries  with poor initial
conditions  (due in part to past policies)  will tend to diverge from the rest.  It may  only be possible
to overcome  this if the lagging  countries  can get a large enough "jump  start" and here there may
be an especially  important  role for international  development  assistance,  as private  capital flows
usually  come in only  at a later  stage of the reform process. There will undoubtedly  remain areas
of social  policy  or infrastructure  in which private capital will not participate  even  after successful
reform.
The upshot  of all that one knows at the present juncture is that promoting  growth is good
because it is a potentially and (in most case) actually important vehicle for improving the living
standards  at all levels, and we now have a better  idea about the policies that lead to growth,
ranging from the fundamental  institutional and market incentives  to the promotion of macro
stability. While these  policies  should be pursued in all countries, we now suspect  that these will
be less effective and/or less well implemented in high-inequality  countries.  Thus reducing
inequality  is good  because  it will  benefit  the poor both immediately  and in the longer  term through
higher growth.
Apart  from the details  of structural and macro-policy  interventions  that have  already been
mentioned, there are two major aspects  that our analysis  highlights  for the changing  role of the
International  Financial  Institutions. First, there is an important  implication  in the area of greater
selectivity among countries.  Obviously the IFIs should support growth-promoting policies in all
countries. But  the focus  should  be on countries  that are clearly  committed  to  reform. It appears
that low-inequality  countries  may well be more likely to be responsive  to the need for reforms,
and more able to implement  them in a shared-growth  fashion.  Testing  commitment  in high-
inequality countries  would  seem especially important.  Up-front actions  that are both growth-
promoting and equity-enhancing  may be the only realistic solution but even this-experience
shows-does  not necessarily  guarantee  sustainabiity.  The second important  implication  comes
from the externality  that appears  to be associated  with improvement  in the distribution  of assets
and income;  future  generations  benefit  because  future growth  will tend to be higher through  better
policies and better access to credit markets.  If further research establishes  the strength and25
robustness  of this result, then it has an important  policy implication:  the IFIs should be willing
to subsidize  actions  that  encourage  redistibution, especially  mvestment  in basic education  and land
reform.26
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